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Building a New Image of Africa
“Dissident States” and the Emergence of French Neo-colonialism in the
Aftermath of Decolonization1
Alexander Keese
An Interventionist Regional Power that does not Intervene 
1 In the second half of September 1958, territorial French administration in Guinea became
pure  chaos. The  Constitutional  referendum  was  close.  Everyone  among  the  French
officials who was somehow realistic knew that in Conakry the game was lost. At least, one
had  to  consider  it,  if  the  French  administration  did  not  directly  intervene  into  the
process,  in some way or another (Bart  1992:  378-378;  Benoist  1982:  410-411,  413-417;
Chafer  2002:  173-177;  Charles  1997:  111-113;  Mortimer  1969:  314-318;  Schmidt  2007:
170-172).
2 There was indeed some activity carried out by the French administrative services. If
someone had observed what was going on in the Conakry headquarters of the local postal
services,  he  would  have  probably  been  surprised  by  such  a  considerable  amount  of
activity. The civil servants in the territorial Post Office were carrying out an ingenuous
scheme elaborated by the Director of the Postal Services, Bidault. In a sort of nocturnal
action, African and French employees of the office evacuated stamps worth 250 Millions
cfa.  Those stamps were thus prevented from falling into the hands of  a coming new
independent regime, which would in that way be deprived of a small financial asset!2.
3 But that was all. Apart from such rather derisory activity, French officials did not act in
these unruly days. Undoubtedly, there might have been other fields in which the French
could have set the tune. A telegram from Koundara, thirteen days before the referendum,
reported severe attacks of the ruling party’s shock troops against the adherents of the
opposition in that region. Sékou Touré, future dictator and strong man of the territory,
showed that he would not accept any opposition against his course. “All the huts of the
Fula inhabitants are burning”, remarked the French Governor Jean Mauberna dryly. This
would have been a good pretext to intervene with armed French police forces and to
disperse the rioters. The French territorial government could have demonstrated to the
supporters of a future of Guinea’s inside of the French orbit that the still-colonial power
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would not leave its “loyal” populations unprotected. However, the responsible French
officials in Conakry and Dakar decided not to act3.
4 Some thousand miles away, in the narrow West African territory of Togo, the situation
was similar, at least at first glance. Togo had been, since 1919, a trusteeship territory of
the League of Nations and of the United Nations, but administered by the French, who did
not care a lot about international control and who governed the territory according to
the standards of direct administration in the other French overseas territories. In the
first  half  of  the 1950s,  international  pressure for more self-government in Togo was
growing, but the French did not give way (Michel 1986: 97-100). A crucial turning point
was  the  elections  of  27  April  1958,  in  which  the  outwardly  pro-French  territorial
government of Nicolas Grunitzky was beaten by the opposition party Comité d’Union
Togolaise (CUT). The CUT had for years demanded autonomy or even independence for
Togo, and its electoral success, five months before the referendum about the future of the
other French territories in sub-Saharan Africa, was thus a major precedent (Michel 1988:
313-314). Consequently, the world held its breath and waited if the French government
would accept the defeat of its crony Grunitzky. Three days later, it became obvious that
the  French Overseas  Services  and  French diplomacy  as  well  would  acknowledge  the
legitimacy of the result4.
5 Obviously,  the  French  officials  did  not  have  many  options. The  international  public
observed the situation in  Togo closely  for  some time in  1958,  so  there  was  no easy
justification for  further  French intervention in Lomé governmental  affairs. However,
after international attention had turned away from the now-autonomous territory, the
French  administrators  who  had  remained  in  the  field  could  have  undermined  the
authority of the CUT. This did not happen. The further evolution remained to be worlds
away from a French attempt to topple the new Olympio government in favour of its
former clients.
6 To the contrary,  on 2  January 1959,  the French army general  in Cotonou,  Dahomey,
decided to send paratroopers to Lomé to defend the regime against a possible coup d’État
of leftist groups supported from Ghana. While the US American Time magazine, obviously
informed through a leak in the French High Commissariat in Cotonou, reported about a
French “invasion” in a colonialist style, the opposite was true. Sylvanus Olympio himself
had invited the French troops to come to Lomé. Hence, French military detachments
were helping out a statesman the French overseas ministry had considered a dangerous
element only a short period before5.
7 These two stories concerning “dissident territories” are in plain contradiction to what
scholars commenting on the French transfer of power in sub-Saharan Africa generally
assume. When writing about the French engagement in sub-Saharan Africa after the
independence of  the former colonies,  most  scholars have manipulation,  intervention,
economic interest, and patronage for brutal dictators in mind (Péan 1983; Michel 1999). 
In fact, these elements are indeed aspects of what is called French “neo-colonialism” in
sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless,  the non-intervention of  French officials  in the two
cases mentioned above is striking, as the challenge to French interest was so obvious. The
whole issue is more complex than it seems at first glance, and we would thus attempt to
understand what the examples of the French encounter with “dissident states” tell us
about  the  mindset  of  French  African  policy  specialists  in  the  first  decade  after
decolonization. They also clarify the nature of relations between African elite members
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and French officials, and will help us describe more generally the mechanisms of French
neo-colonialism in its early phase.
Involuntary Processes: Communist Fear, Panic, and Strategies 
8 To understand French behaviour in the Togo and Guinea crises of  1958 and in their
aftermath, it is necessary to highlight two aspects of the reform process inside of the
decolonizing French empire in sub-Saharan Africa. Those two aspects have formerly been
interpreted in a way that is relatively simplistic, as the standard interpretation does not
explain many processes of the 1950s, i.e. of the period leading to decolonization.
9 Most  scholars  assume that  the French,  learning from defeat  in Indochina and North
Africa,  had  simply  decided  to  let  the  Black  Africans  go. However,  they  would  have
undertaken their retreat in the framework of a manipulated decolonization. This scheme
would have left the former colonies weak and dependent on French help (Nugent 2004:
48-49)6.
10 Yet, for the average French official, what was most important in the 1950s was to prevent
what those officials regarded as a “Soviet takeover” of Africa. Ever after the riots in some
West African territories in the late 1940s, caused frequently by the activities of a regional
party then connected to the French Communist  Party,  the French civil  servants  saw
Communists everywhere. This was not mere rhetoric. For the French administrator-in-
the-field, including most Black administrators, the Communist threat was simply a reality
7. Thus, one had to find ways to convince African politicians that it was more profitable
for their career to co-operate with the local French governors than to “work for Moscow”
(Keese 2007: 140-144).
11 The loi-cadre of 1956 seemed to be an answer to the problem. The subsequent decrees
enlarged the power of the territorial  assemblies in local  questions and promoted the
creation of councils of the governor, executive councils into which the assembly deputies
sent  their  own  elected  representatives. Those  executive  councils  were  particularly
formed to give potential  Black partners satisfying posts. Many French administrators
were doubtful when considering the implications of the law. Nevertheless, they admitted
that  reform legislation  was  a  reasonable  measure  in  the  fight  against  a  Communist
infiltration of  French Black Africa8. What the makers of  the loi-cadre and the French
administrators did not see was that the law did not give the French governor any legal
authority  to  command  his  new  councillors. He  could  not  force  them  to  follow  his
opinions. The whole system was built upon the belief that Black Africans would follow the
governor anyway9.
12 This assumption was a crucial error. The new African ruling parties would not follow the
French authorities at all. The vice-presidents of the councils of the governor attempted to
create themselves their own private realms, they struggled to control the public services. 
In most territories, until 1958, the police got into their hands, and they could utilise or, at
least, neutralise this force when terrorising the opposition through rapidly created party
militia (Charles 1992: 367-369). Under those circumstances, the French authorities did
frequently not dare to directly confront the strong men of the African parties. The most
engaged of these challengers of French power was Sékou Touré, although it is possible
that he in particular was pushed into his position by activists at the grass-roots of his
party, as Elizabeth Schmidt holds it10.
13 Other African leaders were less aggressive in their rhetoric and in the way they treated
the French governor. They attempted to convince the French high administrators to co-
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operate with them, now that the law had unexpectedly reversed the balance of power. One
of these more “polite” leaders was Nicolas Grunitzky, becoming the first African prime
minister of Togo—which resembled the role of the vice-president of the council of the
governor in the regular French overseas territories, Togo being formally a United Nations
trusteeship  territory  with  a  particular  status  (Amenumey  1989)11. However,  for  his
apparent compliance, Grunitzky and his circle of friends demanded more and more rights
from the French. Also,  they intended to make sure that the opposition party around
Sylvanus Olympio would never again get a foothold in Togo12. When the acting district
commissioner Humann attempted to protect the pro-CUT inhabitants of the surroundings
of  Atakpamé  from  the  activities  of  pro-government  marauders,  the  Grunitzky
government  pressured  the  French  to  remove  the  young  official13. While  thus the
Grunitzky regime was not “pro-Communist” and utilised a mostly pro-French rhetoric,
French authorities were not entirely happy with the behaviour of government members. 
It was not quite clear if they were “real friends of the French Republic”.
From Strategist to Arch-enemy: 
Sékou Touré and the Negative Interpretation of Defiance 
14 As we have seen, the results of the referendum in Guinea were a serious shock for the
French belief in a renewed and reinforced bond between the French Republic and its
African colonies. The question for the involved French officials was how to interpret this
particular event. In this context, a clear opinion only formed in the course of the first two
years after the referendum. This fact delayed a consistent plan for the strategy to be
chosen.
15 First of all, for the French there were several reasons to topple Sékou Touré as president
of the new independent state. The sensation that he had betrayed the generous offers of
the  French  Republic  prevailed. The  facts,  that  the  Touré  regime  had  terrorised  the
opposition to win the referendum and that numerous arrests had taken place without any
proper legal procedure, nor any consent of the French governor, were generally known
among French African policy specialists14. Intervention would thus have been defendable.
However,  it  did  not  happen. It  is  remarkable  that  such  measures  were  even  rarely
discussed.
16 Direct French military intervention was impossible, given the fact that the world looked
at Conakry in the days of the referendum. But a de-stabilisation of the regime from inside
would have been feasible. In N’Zérékoré, the Guerze populations already showed signs of
unrest in November 195815. Macenta and the mine regions were also subject to internal
conflict16. In the Pita district, first protests were manifest in November 1958 and then
again in January 1959, with many inhabitants of the region fleeing beyond the borders17. 
Particularly, Liberia would host a large community of Guinean immigrants whose attitude
towards the new regime had normally not been friendly, and became even worse after
three months of independence18. Part of this group were recent exiles, such as a notable
from Guéckedou, who actively prepared armed guerrilla in the west of the country19. Next
to Fouricariah, local populations refused to pay the raised tax rate; in the mine city of
Fria, workers rioted against the introduction of a lower salary scale; in Beyla, the cattle
owners were furious about a new tax on their livestock20. A tendency of resisting the new
independent regime was thus widespread,  but it  was in urgent need of financial  and
logistic support from outside21. However, while the French High Commissioner in Dakar,
Pierre Messmer, and the French Overseas Minister, Bernard Cornut-Gentille, considered
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lending  support  to  “pro-French”  groups  in  the  country,  those  plans  were  never
effectively implemented22. The opposition stood alone.
17 Even the threats of the Touré regime against French settlers did not provoke any decisive
French action. In December 1958, the Political Director of the French Overseas Ministry,
Léon Pignon, finally planned for a potential massive invasion of French troops, which
would have been meant to protect French citizens. However, these measures were in the
end not necessary. The Touré regime conceded in the last possible moment to a more
conciliatory course, thus making French officials renounce coercive action23.
18 The explanation for this contradictory French behaviour is to be found in the fact that
the French had, in the beginning, difficulties to interpret the nature of the new regime. 
Even more,  they refused to admit  the loss  of  a  Black African territory. Had not  the
referendum in  general  been  a  sweeping  success  in  sub-Saharan  Africa?  While  some
French officials  already claimed the  Guinean evolution to  be  a  Communist  takeover,
others still hoped for a coming to terms with an independent Guinea, which would then
“somehow” remain a part  of  the French ensemble. In the beginning,  most observers
directly concerned by the Guinean issue saw Sékou Touré as a simple autocrat, himself
playing with radical notions, but only as a vehicle to bring his troops into the line24. They
also hoped for the influence of young, moderate, French-educated politicians such as Nabi
Youla, who was at the time the Guinean envoy to Paris25. French settlers in the territory
protested against what they considered a naive optimism in French government circles26. 
This optimism was indeed prevalent inside the team sent to Conakry to negotiate the
terms  of  effective  Guinean  independence. Paul  Risterucci,  the  new  French  High
Commissioner, emphasised that the leaders of the new regime in Conakry were “simple
autocrats”,  as  to  be found in all  the African territories,  and no Communists  at  all27. 
Risterucci was so conciliatory towards the Touré regime that even his direct superiors
criticised  him sometimes  to  be  an  “ambassador”  of  French  good  will  rather  than  a
representative having to negotiate on hard terms with the Conakry regime28. Raymond
Bargues,  leading  the  French  diplomatic  mission  in  Conakry,  was  more  adamant  but
mostly absent from Guinea29. In contrast, the effectually responsible official for relations
with the Guinean Government, Brouin, regarded a “realistic” course as inevitable. Such a
realistic course meant concentrating on issues of trade and infrastructure, and accepting
that the Touré regime was simply as authoritarian as any other African government that
would have received the same opportunities30. The Mission d’aménagement, a joint French-
Guinean body elaborating a course of activities that suited both sides, was the visible
proof for a pragmatic French course31.
19 However, this pragmatic course eroded slowly, and with occasional loops, in the years
1958 to 1960. This was mostly due to the behaviour of the President Sékou Touré himself. 
Touré had to compensate for a bleak economic perspective, and such compensation was
most easily achieved by political discourse (Barry 2002). In his speeches and, particularly,
in the context of alleged or real conspiracy against his regime, he attacked the French as
neo-colonial schemers32. In December 1959 the Mission d’aménagement was expelled from
Guinean territory33. French company personnel and teachers were constantly confronted
with widespread hostility, which normally was a direct product of the regime’s rhetoric34.
The whole of the Guinean unique party, the Parti démocratique de la Guinée, was built on
the theme of anti-colonial and anti-French propaganda35. When in April 1960 a number of
Senegalese residents in Conakry was arrested by the Guinean police, this happened under
the charge that they had plotted, relying on funds paid by the French embassy, for a coup
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d’état  against  the  Touré  regime36. The  Guinean  secret  services  even  sent  an  agent
provocateur to the French troops in neighbouring Ivory Coast, whose activities were to
deliver the proofs for the eagerness of the French army to support anti-government plots
in Conakry37.
20 The anti-French behaviour of the Touré government gave those elements in the French
administration the upper  hand that  had from the outset  believed in the Communist
nature of the regime. Rhetorical radicalism and repression were here set as equal to plans
for the creation of a People’s Republic. In 1959, the French officials reported increasingly
about what they regarded a Soviet infiltration of Guinea. They pointed mostly to an—
allegedly—dangerous and growing number of Eastern Block specialists in the country and
to  the  re-building  of  the  local  economy  with  reference  to  Communist  forms  of
organisation38.
21 Rumours about Guinea made the round, and what the French in the country observed as
the  course  of  the  Touré  government  was  not  very  reassuring. The  country  was
restructured  via  a  centralisation  and  nationalisation  of  trade  networks,  the  banking
sector and the production industry39. The party used its militia against striking school
teachers and pupils who were severely beaten up40. Occasionally, Sékou Touré had one of
his outbursts of rage against the capitalist West41. These issues fortified the image of
Guinea as a Communist vanguard until 1965.
22 In the reality, the course of the regime remained as contradictory as before. From time to
time,  an  engaged  French  Ambassador  attempted  to  improve  the  relations  with  the
Guinean ruler42. The acting Ambassador Koenig reported in 1964 about relaxed talks with
Sékou Touré in the President’s suburban villa, and he even managed to re-establish a
Mixed Commission for joint affairs for some months43. However, all these projects were
respectively skipped by the Guineans after a short time. Normally,  at the next major
internal crisis the regime reinforced its anti-French propaganda to satisfy party militants
who still waited for a socio-economic miracle that did not come. The latter desperately
needed a scapegoat for the regime’s lack of economic success44.
23 On the other side, the French administrators had also desperately needed a scapegoat for
what had happened in 1958. With the behaviour of the Sékou Touré regime, they finally
had their explanation for the defeat of the Communauté project. It was not a lack of
loyalty of the Africans to the virtues of the French Republic and thus of the French mission
civilisatrice, but rather a perfidious Communist subversion that had cost the French parts
of their old empire. Guinea had been lost because of Soviet infiltration. Moreover, this
Cold War scenario—which also made it difficult to imagine the French invasion of an
already “completely lost state”—gave a meaning to the failures in the transfer of power. 
It provided former administrators who continued to work in African affairs with a clear
mission: to prevent the other Francophone African countries to be infected by the same
virus; to fight Soviet subversion in Africa with all means; and to identify those African
friends in whom the French Republic could trust45. That “the Soviets” had plans for the
rest of Francophone Africa was evident for the French from Guinean initiatives in former
French West  Africa. Moreover,  Sékou Touré still  controlled the former federal  trade
union, Union générale des travailleurs en Afrique noire. French officials wanted to secure
that this organisation was neutralised in the other, now independent countries. In this
objective, they met with the interest of the post-colonial African leaders. Those were all
too happy to get rid of a potential opposition movement in their own countries46. The
interpretation of the Guinean blunder, which became increasingly consistent in 1959 and
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1960, thus gave the French a model how to understand events in “their” part of Africa,
and whom to regard as friend or foe.
Unreliable Friends: Sylvanus Olympio, Nicolas Grunitzky, 
and the Limits of African Veneration Towards Paris
24 Togo became one of the first test cases for this model. Most recent publications, in a
rather polemic way, hold that the French were hostile to the Olympio regime from the
start. They  even  speculate  that  French  “neo-colonialists”  were  behind  Olympio’s
assassination in 1963 and the military takeover of power in 1967 (Labarthe 2005: 41-49;
Verschave  1998). The  reality  was  more  complex. It  was  the  model  drawn from the
Guinean experience  that  played for  the  French the  decisive  role  in  interpreting  the
Togolese evolution.
25 With the takeover by the CUT government, the French remained insecure how to treat
Sylvanus  Olympio. Different  factors  complicated  the  interpretation  of  the  Togolese
evolution. French officials regarded Olympio as an instrument of Kwame N’Krumah, the
head  of  the  independent  government  of  neighbouring  Ghana,  seen  as  a  convinced
Communist47. The Directorate of the Economic Division in the French Overseas Ministry
consequently wondered, in 1958, if, under such circumstances, it was justified to make
continuously a high contribution to the budget of now-autonomous Togo. French funding
amounted to two third of the Togolese gross domestic product. Officials in Paris criticised
that those funds rolled into the pockets of a regime of Communist fellow travellers?48.
26 This  negative  first  conclusion  was  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  the  French  High
Commissioner continued to treat the leading figures of the former Togolese government,
Nicolas Grunitzky and Pierre Ajavon, as the country’s principal friends and allies of the
interest of Paris. The High Commissioner Spénale was eager to give Grunitzky material
support to continue his political work49. In 1962, the former Togolese Prime Minister and
former  French civil  servant  Grunitzky,  now in  exile,  even struggled  to  get  a  higher
pension out of the French budget...50.
27 However, in the years 1958 to 1960, the French specialists for African policy started to
revise their interpretation of the CUT regime. Much of this turn had to do with what they
regarded  as  Olympio’s  personality. Secret  reports  about  the  Togolese  head  of  state
continued to present him as Anglophile and pro-Independence, but they also described
him as strictly anti-Communist51. French observers were completely surprised by the
hostilities  between  Olympio  and  the  Ghanaian  government  since  late  1958. In  this
conflict, the Togolese government pleaded for French support; and the French conceded
to  Olympio  that  he  was  an  ally  against  the  demands  of  “Soviet-backed”  Ghana52. 
Moreover,  the younger,  more radical,  and rhetorically Marxist members of Olympio’s
coalition partner Juvento broke with him at the end of the same year. From this point,
French officials emphasised that it were the Juvento “Communists” around Aithson who
constituted  the  real  danger  for  French  interest  in  Togo53. To  the  contrary,  the
Government itself was no longer suspect54. Thus, while the makers of France’s African
policy became increasingly convinced, in 1959, that Sékou Touré and the new Guinean
regime were Communist and hostile, the vision of Sylvanus Olympio and the Togolese
regime changed into the opposite direction.
28 Henri  Mazoyer,  the  new  French  Ambassador  in  Togo  in  1961,  put  it  like  this:  As
everywhere in Africa, democracy did not stand a chance, even not with Sylvanus Olympio,
who was not a Communist at all, but a “liberal bourgeois”. According to this vision, the
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young (potential)  Communists hid in the background, and attempted to infiltrate the
unique party, with success:
“Même  dans  ce  Togo  gouverné  par  un  bourgeois  libéral,  la  liste  unique,
l’intimidation,  le  matraquage  qui  va  jusqu’au  meurtre,  ne  laissent  pas  grande
chance à l’opposition. Celle-ci se réfugiera dans la clandestinité, ou bien au sein du
parti unique et triomphant pour le noyauter. C’est vers quoi tendent certains jeunes
Turcs gagnés au ‘socialisme africain’. Ces jeunes, mûrissants, ayant déjà en mains
des leviers administratifs puissants, ne sont pas communistes, mais les structures
économiques de leurs vœux, s’harmoniseraient plus facilement avec celles des pays
de  l’Est  qu’avec  les  nôtres.  Si  nous  ne  faisons  pas  preuve  d’imagination  pour
aménager des structures d’accueil pour ce ‘socialisme africain’, il sera aiguillé vers
le communisme”55.
29 There are no real proofs that the French were behind the crisis that Togo went through in
early 1963. In January 1963,  a coup d’État overthrew the Olympio regime. Mutinying
officers assassinated the President who had fled on the ground of the American Embassy. 
Suspicions point to French involvement, but we do not have any concrete clue that either
the French Foreign Ministry or the Secretariat of African Affairs attempted actively to
topple the Togolese government,  as  studies based on journalistic  investigation try to
prove. We  cannot  be  certain  that  the  French  Ambassador  Henri  Mazoyer  did  not
encourage leading army officers to get rid of Olympio, but there is no documentation
indicating that the Ambassador received any instructions or support for such an activity
from the Quai d’Orsay or from Jacques Foccart. What is even more striking, however, is
that the adherents of Olympio, organising themselves in a Comité de salut public after the
mutinying army forces had arrested the majority of the ministers, do not mention any
French involvement in the incidents at all. The CUT leaders accused Ghana to pay the
mutineers, to sabotage the country and to terrorise the members of the once-ruling party
56. If Mazoyer was believed to be the grey eminence behind the putsch, would he not have
been severely attacked by the followers of Olympio?
30 French  officials  were  not  entirely  happy  with  economic  diversification,  which  the
Olympio government had tried to promote, and had attacked what they regarded as a
missing effort of the Togolese to co-ordinate themselves with France’s African policy57. 
However, we have no indications that the French actively intended to force Togo into
another direction,  by liquidating the acting government. Also,  the influence of  their
former  client  Grunitzky,  although protected  by  the  French and equipped with  some
French money privileges, was relatively small. After an assassination attempt against the
former Togolese Prime Minister and his family in April 1962, the French suspected the
“Communists”; which means they saw no need to enter in a dispute with the Olympio
government concerning the issue58. Finally, Grunitzky’s behaviour in the 1950s had been
ambiguous enough and many a French official doubted if  he was to be qualified as a
reliable friend of the French nation.
31 Nicolas Grunitzky got his second chance to win French grace as head of state of Togo from
January 1963,  and he attempted at his best to convince the French and,  particularly,
President de Gaulle and “the shadow man” Jacques Foccart, that he had to be counted
among the most reliable friends of the French Republic. Grunitzky needed as well the
continuance of French contributions to the Togolese budget and French military support
59. However, the French Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Co-operation retained their
doubts concerning Grunitzky,  and showed no enthusiasm to maintain the number of
French specialists and magistrates in the country, and, even more, to finance the regime’s
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costly industrialisation projects60. The President Grunitzky and Méatchi, president of the
coalition  partner  of  the  governmental  party,  protested  towards  Foccart  against  the
reluctance of both involved French ministries to help out the Togolese partners61.
32 The cleavage between the Foccart Secretariat and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became
more visible when in late 1966 first signs of instability inside the Grunitzky government
became  evident. Jacques  Foccart  declared  himself  for  Grunitzky  and  assured  the
president he would protect the latter’s rule62. Claude Roustain, the French Ambassador in
Lomé,  was  not  at  all  positive  to  such  a  course. He was  much more  sceptical  about
Grunitzky’s personality and refused to require French troops against the rioters in the
streets of the capital. Finally, in January 1967, the Ambassador accepted a coup d’État of
the Togolese army general Etienne Eyadéma against the president. Grunitzky was, as the
French official interpreted it, a rather unreliable friend of the French nation (if really a
friend at all), and not preferable to an army leader who was said to be clearly pro-French
63. Thus, Army General “Gbassindje” Eyadéma became the French man in Lomé.
33 French attitudes towards “secessionist states” show that the involved French officials—
those who “stayed in the African business” after the transfers of  power—desperately
needed an explanation for why the colonial partnership under French leadership had
gone wrong. They found their explanation after initial struggles in the first months after
the referendum. From what French officials experienced concerning Guinea, they drew
the model that what happened in sub-Saharan Africa was a fight between good and evil,
pro-French and anti-French, anti-Soviet and pro-Moscow. The final criteria for judging if
one of the new African governments was to be considered friend or foe, was the personal
relationship  of  its  African  leader  with  leading  French  officials,  and  the  French
interpretation of his reliability and his behaviour before independence.
34 Thus, Guinea served as the ideal negative case. In the future, every “mischief” occurring
in  the  former  French colonies  in  sub-Saharan Africa  would  be  interpreted  as  Soviet
activity, executed by the “Communist regime” in Conakry. In that way, the hostile French
behaviour only strengthened the position of Sékou Touré. He could claim to be a victim of
French  neo-colonialism  and  thus  justify  the  activities  of  one  of  the  most  brutal
dictatorships on the African continent.
35 In Togo, the evolution was different. This was due to the fact that a “leftist” opposition
emerged exactly during the phase when the French finally made their decision how to
view the Olympio regime in Lomé. The conflict between Olympio and his former Juvento
allies, and the tensions between “Communist” Ghana and “liberal bourgeois” Togo helped
the president to achieve some credit as a friend of France. However, this friendship was
too ambiguous to guarantee an effective protection of the regime in the moment of crisis
in early 1963 that led to the assassination of the head of state. The “friendship” between
the French Republic and Olympio’s  successor Grunitzky was likewise uneasy, because
Grunitzky had exerted strong pressure on the French and occasionally threatened with a
Togolese road to independence in 1957. The French would not pardon this. Finally, in
1967,  they  preferred  a  general  educated  in  France  as  president  to  the  “bickering”,
“unreliable” politicians. The dictatorship of Eyadéma thus found its origins in the fact
that neither of the possible candidates in Togo could claim a friendship with France that
was strong enough to make the French help him out in situations of crisis.
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the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).
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RÉSUMÉS
Bâtir une nouvelle image de l’Afrique: les “États dissidents” et l’émergence du néocolonialisme français au
lendemain de la décolonisation. — En 1958, l’État français perdit le contrôle de deux de ses anciens
territoires africains, la Guinée et le Togo. Dans un premier temps, cette perte de contrôle fut
totale  mais  les  dirigeants  togolais  établirent  rapidement  une  relation  de  travail  avec  Paris.
Survenus entre la promulgation de la loi-cadre et la mise en place du nouveau gouvernement de
Charles  de  Gaulle,  ces  événements  furent  un  choc  pour  les  dirigeants  français.  Ces  derniers
devaient  toutefois  s’adapter  aux  nouvelles  circonstances  politiques,  et  ils  firent  le choix
d’adopter une nouvelle politique plutôt que d’intervenir directement. L’attitude de la France face
à  ces  “États  dissidents”  devait  influencer  sensiblement  la  manière  dont  ces  responsables
politiques  français  allaient  interpréter  la  situation  en  Afrique  sub-saharienne.  Ainsi,  les
décideurs politiques français commencèrent à considérer l’Afrique comme un champ de bataille
opposant amis et ennemis, traîtres procommunistes et partenaires loyaux.
In 1958, the French state lost control over two of its former African territories, Guinea and Togo. 
This loss of control was, at first instance, complete, although the Togolese leaders soon found a
working relationship with Paris. In the period between the loi-cadre and the establishment of the
new government  of  Charles  de  Gaulle,  such  events  came as  a  shock  to  the  French  officials. 
However, they had to cope with the new political circumstances, and they did this by slowly
formulating  a  new  policy  instead  of  intervening  directly. The  French  experience  with  such
“dissident  states”  influenced  strongly  how  those  officials  would  in  the  future  interpret  the
situation  in  sub-Saharan  Africa. French  policy-makers  would  begin  to  see  Africa  as  a
battleground between friends and foes, between pro-Communist traitors and loyal partners.
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